Fix nodedev XML conversion errors (bz 591262)

Fix PCI xml decimal parsing (bz 582752)
Fix CDROM media connect/eject (bz 582005)
Always report qemu startup output on error (bz 581381)
Fix crash from 'virsh dominfo' if secdriver disabled (bz 581166)

.cvsignore

@@ -8,3 +8,11 @@ libvirt-0.6.1.tar.gz
 libvirt-0.6.2.tar.gz
 libvirt-0.6.3.tar.gz
 libvirt-0.6.4.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.6.5.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.7.0.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.7.1.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.7.2.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.7.3.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.7.4.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.7.5.tar.gz
+libvirt-0.7.6.tar.gz

Makefile

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME := libvirt
 SPECFILE = $(firstword $(wildcard *.spec))
 
 define find-makefile-common
-for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
+for d in common ../common ../../common ; do if [ -f $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then if [ -f $$d/CVS/Root -a -w $$d/Makefile.common ] ; then cd $$d ; cvs -Q update ; fi ; echo "$$d/Makefile.common" ; break ; fi ; done
 endef
 
 MAKEFILE_COMMON := $(shell $(find-makefile-common))

branch

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+F-13

libvirt-0.6.4-do-not-unnecessarily-try-to-change-a-file-context.patch

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From ae4523336ac06e3ff7cc7b416fad9e57998c6b54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tim Waugh <twaugh@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2009 10:29:01 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Don't unnecessarily try to change a file context
-
-As pointed out by Tim Waugh here:
-
-  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/507555
-
-We shouldn't bother trying to set the context of a file if it already
-matches what we want.
-
-(Fixed to use STREQ() and not use tabs, as pointed out by danpb)
-
-Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
----
- src/security_selinux.c |   11 ++++++++++-
- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/security_selinux.c b/src/security_selinux.c
-index db1c27d..c2015a1 100644
---- a/src/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security_selinux.c
-@@ -280,10 +280,19 @@ static int
- SELinuxSetFilecon(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path, char *tcon)
- {
-     char ebuf[1024];
-+    security_context_t econ;
- 
-     VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon);
- 
--    if(setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
-+    if (setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
-+        if (getfilecon(path, &econ) >= 0) {
-+            if (STREQ(tcon, econ)) {
-+                freecon(econ);
-+                /* It's alright, there's nothing to change anyway. */
-+                return 0;
-+            }
-+            freecon(econ);
-+        }
-         virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
-                                _("%s: unable to set security context "
-                                  "'\%s\' on %s: %s."), __func__,
--- 
-1.6.2.5
-

libvirt-0.6.4-fix-libvirtd-crash-with-bad-capabilities-data.patch

@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-From 80965bff6d46dea1808c8bbf02f50f0e289a0e65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2009 10:41:56 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash in QEMU driver with bad capabilities data
-
----
- src/qemu_driver.c |   80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
-
-diff -up libvirt-0.6.2/src/qemu_driver.c.bad-caps libvirt-0.6.2/src/qemu_driver.c
---- libvirt-0.6.2/src/qemu_driver.c.bad-caps	2009-07-03 10:07:03.275252815 +0100
-+++ libvirt-0.6.2/src/qemu_driver.c	2009-07-03 10:08:52.143502961 +0100
-@@ -360,12 +360,43 @@ next:
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-+
-+static int
-+qemudSecurityCapsInit(virSecurityDriverPtr secdrv,
-+                      virCapsPtr caps)
-+{
-+    const char *doi, *model;
-+
-+    doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(secdrv);
-+    model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(secdrv);
-+
-+    caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model);
-+    if (!caps->host.secModel.model) {
-+        char ebuf[1024];
-+        VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to copy secModel model: %s"),
-+                  virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi);
-+    if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) {
-+        char ebuf[1024];
-+        VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to copy secModel DOI: %s"),
-+                  virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    VIR_DEBUG("Initialized caps for security driver \"%s\" with "
-+              "DOI \"%s\"", model, doi);
-+
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- static int
- qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
- {
-     int ret;
--    const char *doi, *model;
--    virCapsPtr caps;
-     virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
- 
-     ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv,
-@@ -381,36 +412,17 @@ qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *q
-     }
- 
-     qemud_drv->securityDriver = security_drv;
--    doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(security_drv);
--    model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(security_drv);
- 
--    VIR_DEBUG("Initialized security driver \"%s\" with "
--              "DOI \"%s\"", model, doi);
-+    VIR_INFO("Initialized security driver %s", security_drv->name);
- 
-     /*
-      * Add security policy host caps now that the security driver is
-      * initialized.
-      */
--    caps = qemud_drv->caps;
--
--    caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model);
--    if (!caps->host.secModel.model) {
--        char ebuf[1024];
--        VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to copy secModel model: %s"),
--                  virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
--        return -1;
--    }
-+    return qemudSecurityCapsInit(security_drv, qemud_drv->caps);
-+}
- 
--    caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi);
--    if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) {
--        char ebuf[1024];
--        VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to copy secModel DOI: %s"),
--                  virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
--        return -1;
--    }
- 
--    return 0;
--}
- 
- /**
-  * qemudStartup:
-@@ -1852,13 +1864,29 @@ static int qemudGetNodeInfo(virConnectPt
- 
- static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
-     struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
-+    virCapsPtr caps;
-     char *xml = NULL;
- 
-     qemuDriverLock(driver);
-+    if ((caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL) {
-+        virReportOOMError(conn);
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (qemu_driver->securityDriver &&
-+        qemudSecurityCapsInit(qemu_driver->securityDriver, caps) < 0) {
-+        virCapabilitiesFree(caps);
-+        virReportOOMError(conn);
-+        goto cleanup;
-+    }
-+
-     virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
--    if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL ||
--        (xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
-+    qemu_driver->caps = caps;
-+
-+    if ((xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
-         virReportOOMError(conn);
-+
-+cleanup:
-     qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
- 
-     return xml;

libvirt-0.6.4-fix-nosource-label.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 06f607a9c5cfd50433ae27cc7729c31f81d87f19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2009 10:40:55 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Skip labelling if no src path present
-
-Fixes startup of guest's with sourceless cdrom devices.
-
-Patch originall posted here:
-
-  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/499569
-
-but never sent upstream.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
----
- src/security_selinux.c |    3 +++
- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/security_selinux.c b/src/security_selinux.c
-index c2015a1..eb8d308 100644
---- a/src/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security_selinux.c
-@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
- {
-     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
- 
-+    if (!disk->src)
-+        return 0;
-+
-     if (disk->shared) {
-         return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
-     } else if (disk->readonly) {
--- 
-1.6.2.5
-

libvirt-0.6.4-shared-readonly-label.patch

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-From e700e17c3989d32e04ef98c63ac9b9414fefb366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2009 10:24:50 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Re-label shared and readonly images
-
-This patch was posted ages ago here:
-
-  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/493692
-
-But was never posted upstream AFAICT.
-
-Signed-off-by: Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com>
----
- src/security_selinux.c |   27 +++++++++++++++++----------
- 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/security_selinux.c b/src/security_selinux.c
-index ac317d7..db1c27d 100644
---- a/src/security_selinux.c
-+++ b/src/security_selinux.c
-@@ -24,11 +24,12 @@
- #include "virterror_internal.h"
- #include "util.h"
- #include "memory.h"
--
-+#include "logging.h"
- 
- #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECURITY
- 
- static char default_domain_context[1024];
-+static char default_content_context[1024];
- static char default_image_context[1024];
- #define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI       "0"
- #define SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME "selinux"
-@@ -148,8 +149,13 @@ SELinuxInitialize(virConnectPtr conn)
-     close(fd);
- 
-     ptr = strchrnul(default_image_context, '\n');
--    *ptr = '\0';
--
-+    if (*ptr == '\n') {
-+        *ptr = '\0';
-+        strcpy(default_content_context, ptr+1);
-+        ptr = strchrnul(default_content_context, '\n');
-+        if (*ptr == '\n')
-+            *ptr = '\0';
-+    }
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-@@ -275,6 +281,8 @@ SELinuxSetFilecon(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path, char *tcon)
- {
-     char ebuf[1024];
- 
-+    VIR_INFO("Setting SELinux context on '%s' to '%s'", path, tcon);
-+
-     if(setfilecon(path, tcon) < 0) {
-         virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
-                                _("%s: unable to set security context "
-@@ -299,9 +307,6 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
-     char *newpath = NULL;
-     const char *path = disk->src;
- 
--    if (disk->readonly || disk->shared)
--        return 0;
--
-     if ((err = virFileResolveLink(path, &newpath)) < 0) {
-         virReportSystemError(conn, err,
-                              _("cannot resolve symlink %s"), path);
-@@ -328,8 +333,13 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
- {
-     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
- 
--    if (secdef->imagelabel)
-+    if (disk->shared) {
-+        return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_image_context);
-+    } else if (disk->readonly) {
-+        return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, default_content_context);
-+    } else if (secdef->imagelabel) {
-         return SELinuxSetFilecon(conn, disk->src, secdef->imagelabel);
-+    }
- 
-     return 0;
- }
-@@ -403,9 +413,6 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
- 
-     if (secdef->imagelabel) {
-         for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
--            if (vm->def->disks[i]->readonly ||
--                vm->def->disks[i]->shared) continue;
--
-             if (SELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(conn, vm, vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
-                 return -1;
-         }
--- 
-1.6.2.5
-

libvirt-0.6.4-svirt-sound.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
---- src/qemu_conf.c.orig	2009-05-29 19:24:59.000000000 +0200
-+++ src/qemu_conf.c	2009-05-29 19:19:39.000000000 +0200
-@@ -792,6 +792,20 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr 
-     char uuid[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN];
-     char domid[50];
-     const char *cpu = NULL;
-+    int skipSound = 0;
-+
-+    if (driver->securityDriver &&
-+        driver->securityDriver->name &&
-+        STREQ(driver->securityDriver->name, "selinux") &&
-+        getuid() == 0) {
-+        static int soundWarned = 0; 
-+        skipSound = 1;
-+        if (def->nsounds &&
-+            !soundWarned) {
-+            soundWarned = 1;
-+            VIR_WARN0("Sound cards for VMs are disabled while SELinux security model is active");
-+        }
-+    }
- 
-     uname_normalize(&ut);
- 
-@@ -1429,7 +1443,8 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr 
-     }
- 
-     /* Add sound hardware */
--    if (def->nsounds) {
-+    if (def->nsounds &&
-+        !skipSound) {
-         int size = 100;
-         char *modstr;
-         if (VIR_ALLOC_N(modstr, size+1) < 0)

libvirt-0.7.7-fix-cdrom-change.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+commit c4896d378b921ba6471562d7b17641be121c19d6
+Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date:   Thu Apr 15 11:35:07 2010 +0100
+
+    Fix CDROM media change for QEMU when using -device syntax
+    
+    Disk devices in QEMU have two parts, the guest device and the host
+    backend driver. Historically these two parts have had the same
+    "unique" name. With the switch to using -device though, they now
+    have separate names. Thus when changing CDROM media, for guests
+    using -device syntax, we need to prepend the QEMU_DRIVE_HOST_PREFIX
+    constant
+    
+    * src/qemu/qemu_conf.c, src/qemu/qemu_conf.h: Add helper function
+      qemuDeviceDriveHostAlias() for building a host backend alias
+    * src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Use qemuDeviceDriveHostAlias() to determine
+      the host backend alias for performing eject/change commands in the
+      monitor
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
+index 1a8b4aa..0cbedf2 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
++++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c
+@@ -1699,6 +1699,26 @@ static int qemuAssignDeviceDiskAliasLegacy(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++char *qemuDeviceDriveHostAlias(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
++                               unsigned long long qemudCmdFlags)
++{
++    char *ret;
++
++    if (qemudCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DEVICE) {
++        if (virAsprintf(&ret, "%s%s", QEMU_DRIVE_HOST_PREFIX, disk->info.alias) < 0) {
++            virReportOOMError();
++            return NULL;
++        }
++    } else {
++        if (!(ret = strdup(disk->info.alias))) {
++            virReportOOMError();
++            return NULL;
++        }
++    }
++    return ret;
++}
++
++
+ /* Names used before -drive supported the id= option */
+ static int qemuAssignDeviceDiskAliasFixed(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
+index 574709e..b2820f0 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
++++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.h
+@@ -220,6 +220,9 @@ char * qemuBuildNicStr(virDomainNetDefPtr net,
+ char * qemuBuildNicDevStr(virDomainNetDefPtr net,
+                           int vlan);
+ 
++char *qemuDeviceDriveHostAlias(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
++                               unsigned long long qemudCmdFlags);
++
+ /* Both legacy & current support */
+ char *qemuBuildDriveStr(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
+                         int bootable,
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 0189dcf..7d2f3ef 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -6552,11 +6552,13 @@ cleanup:
+ 
+ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+                                            virDomainObjPtr vm,
+-                                           virDomainDiskDefPtr disk)
++                                           virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
++                                           unsigned long long qemuCmdFlags)
+ {
+     virDomainDiskDefPtr origdisk = NULL;
+     int i;
+     int ret;
++    char *driveAlias = NULL;
+ 
+     origdisk = NULL;
+     for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->ndisks ; i++) {
+@@ -6594,6 +6596,9 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+         driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityImageLabel(vm, disk) < 0)
+         return -1;
+ 
++    if (!(driveAlias = qemuDeviceDriveHostAlias(origdisk, qemuCmdFlags)))
++        goto error;
++
+     qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData;
+     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
+     if (disk->src) {
+@@ -6605,10 +6610,10 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+                 format = origdisk->driverType;
+         }
+         ret = qemuMonitorChangeMedia(priv->mon,
+-                                     origdisk->info.alias,
++                                     driveAlias,
+                                      disk->src, format);
+     } else {
+-        ret = qemuMonitorEjectMedia(priv->mon, origdisk->info.alias);
++        ret = qemuMonitorEjectMedia(priv->mon, driveAlias);
+     }
+     qemuDomainObjExitMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
+ 
+@@ -6625,11 +6630,14 @@ static int qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(struct qemud_driver *driver,
+     disk->src = NULL;
+     origdisk->type = disk->type;
+ 
++    VIR_FREE(driveAlias);
++
+     virDomainDiskDefFree(disk);
+ 
+     return ret;
+ 
+ error:
++    VIR_FREE(driveAlias);
+     if (driver->securityDriver &&
+         driver->securityDriver->domainRestoreSecurityImageLabel &&
+         driver->securityDriver->domainRestoreSecurityImageLabel(vm, disk) < 0)
+@@ -7434,7 +7442,9 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachDevice(virDomainPtr dom,
+         switch (dev->data.disk->device) {
+         case VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_CDROM:
+         case VIR_DOMAIN_DISK_DEVICE_FLOPPY:
+-            ret = qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(driver, vm, dev->data.disk);
++            ret = qemudDomainChangeEjectableMedia(driver, vm,
++                                                  dev->data.disk,
++                                                  qemuCmdFlags);
+             if (ret == 0)
+                 dev->data.disk = NULL;
+             break;

libvirt-0.7.7-fix-slow-dsync.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From e3c36a2575bc88a16d776693dc39ea01c780b406 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2010 16:03:59 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Use fsync() at the end of file allocation instead of O_DSYNC
+
+Instead of opening storage file with O_DSYNC, make sure data are written
+to a disk only before we claim allocation has finished.
+---
+ src/storage/storage_backend.c |    9 ++++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend.c b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
+index ec9fc43..7294a00 100644
+--- a/src/storage/storage_backend.c
++++ b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
+@@ -331,6 +331,13 @@ static int createRawFileOpHook(int fd, void *data) {
+                 goto cleanup;
+             }
+         }
++
++        if (fsync(fd) < 0) {
++            ret = errno;
++            virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot sync data to file '%s'"),
++                                 hdata->vol->target.path);
++            goto cleanup;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+ cleanup:
+@@ -359,7 +366,7 @@ virStorageBackendCreateRaw(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+     gid_t gid = (vol->target.perms.gid == -1) ? getgid() : vol->target.perms.gid;
+ 
+     if ((createstat = virFileOperation(vol->target.path,
+-                                       O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_DSYNC,
++                                       O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL,
+                                        vol->target.perms.mode, uid, gid,
+                                        createRawFileOpHook, &hdata,
+                                        VIR_FILE_OP_FORCE_PERMS |
+-- 
+1.6.6.1
+

libvirt-0.7.7-fix-usb-product.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+From 3a441522017aa9c1b8b54d2ce4569d0f0d96fa72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 12:36:56 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Add some debugging at domain startup
+
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index f8ab545..040d645 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -2695,6 +2695,8 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     FD_ZERO(&keepfd);
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Beginning VM startup process");
++
+     if (virDomainObjIsActive(vm)) {
+         qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID,
+                         "%s", _("VM is already active"));
+@@ -2703,22 +2705,27 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+     /* If you are using a SecurityDriver with dynamic labelling,
+        then generate a security label for isolation */
++    DEBUG0("Generating domain security label (if required)");
+     if (driver->securityDriver &&
+         driver->securityDriver->domainGenSecurityLabel &&
+         driver->securityDriver->domainGenSecurityLabel(vm) < 0)
+         return -1;
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Generating setting domain security labels (if required)");
+     if (driver->securityDriver &&
+         driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityAllLabel &&
+         driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityAllLabel(vm) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+-    /* Ensure no historical cgroup for this VM is lieing around bogus settings */
++    /* Ensure no historical cgroup for this VM is lying around bogus
++     * settings */
++    DEBUG0("Ensuring no historical cgroup is lying around");
+     qemuRemoveCgroup(driver, vm, 1);
+ 
+     if ((vm->def->ngraphics == 1) &&
+         vm->def->graphics[0]->type == VIR_DOMAIN_GRAPHICS_TYPE_VNC &&
+         vm->def->graphics[0]->data.vnc.autoport) {
++        DEBUG0("Determining VNC port");
+         int port = qemudNextFreeVNCPort(driver);
+         if (port < 0) {
+             qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+@@ -2735,6 +2742,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Creating domain log file");
+     if ((logfile = qemudLogFD(driver, vm->def->name)) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+@@ -2751,14 +2759,17 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Determing emulator version");
+     if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator,
+                                 NULL,
+                                 &qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Setting up domain cgroup (if required)");
+     if (qemuSetupCgroup(driver, vm) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Preparing host devices");
+     if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(driver, vm->def) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+@@ -2767,6 +2778,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Preparing monitor state");
+     if (qemuPrepareMonitorChr(driver, priv->monConfig, vm->def->name) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+@@ -2798,6 +2810,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+      * use in hotplug
+      */
+     if (qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DEVICE) {
++        DEBUG0("Assigning domain PCI addresses");
+         /* Populate cache with current addresses */
+         if (priv->pciaddrs) {
+             qemuDomainPCIAddressSetFree(priv->pciaddrs);
+@@ -2816,6 +2829,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         priv->persistentAddrs = 0;
+     }
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Building emulator command line");
+     vm->def->id = driver->nextvmid++;
+     if (qemudBuildCommandLine(conn, driver, vm->def, priv->monConfig,
+                               priv->monJSON, qemuCmdFlags, &argv, &progenv,
+@@ -2899,25 +2913,31 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+     if (ret == -1) /* The VM failed to start */
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Waiting for monitor to show up");
+     if (qemudWaitForMonitor(driver, vm, pos) < 0)
+         goto abort;
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Detecting VCPU PIDs");
+     if (qemuDetectVcpuPIDs(driver, vm) < 0)
+         goto abort;
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Setting CPU affinity");
+     if (qemudInitCpuAffinity(vm) < 0)
+         goto abort;
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Setting any required VM passwords");
+     if (qemuInitPasswords(conn, driver, vm, qemuCmdFlags) < 0)
+         goto abort;
+ 
+     /* If we have -device, then addresses are assigned explicitly.
+      * If not, then we have to detect dynamic ones here */
+     if (!(qemuCmdFlags & QEMUD_CMD_FLAG_DEVICE)) {
++        DEBUG0("Determining domain device PCI addresses");
+         if (qemuInitPCIAddresses(driver, vm) < 0)
+             goto abort;
+     }
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Setting initial memory amount");
+     qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
+     if (qemuMonitorSetBalloon(priv->mon, vm->def->memory) < 0) {
+         qemuDomainObjExitMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
+@@ -2925,6 +2945,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+     }
+ 
+     if (migrateFrom == NULL) {
++        DEBUG0("Starting domain CPUs");
+         /* Allow the CPUS to start executing */
+         if (qemuMonitorStartCPUs(priv->mon, conn) < 0) {
+             if (virGetLastError() == NULL)
+@@ -2937,6 +2958,7 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+     qemuDomainObjExitMonitorWithDriver(driver, vm);
+ 
+ 
++    DEBUG0("Writing domain status to disk");
+     if (virDomainSaveStatus(driver->caps, driver->stateDir, vm) < 0)
+         goto abort;
+ 
+-- 
+1.6.6.1
+
+From 6d5c8a8f51db8ce97ab35ab6022dd5c94ab016b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 12:37:52 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] qemu: Fix USB by product with security enabled
+
+We need to call PrepareHostdevs to determine the USB device path before
+any security calls. PrepareHostUSBDevices was also incorrectly skipping
+all USB devices.
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c |   11 ++++++-----
+ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 040d645..b17d26d 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ qemuPrepareHostUSBDevices(struct qemud_driver *driver ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ 
+         if (hostdev->mode != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS)
+             continue;
+-        if (hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI)
++        if (hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_USB)
+             continue;
+ 
+         /* Resolve a vendor/product to bus/device */
+@@ -2703,6 +2703,11 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+         return -1;
+     }
+ 
++    /* Must be run before security labelling */
++    DEBUG0("Preparing host devices");
++    if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(driver, vm->def) < 0)
++        goto cleanup;
++
+     /* If you are using a SecurityDriver with dynamic labelling,
+        then generate a security label for isolation */
+     DEBUG0("Generating domain security label (if required)");
+@@ -2769,10 +2774,6 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnectPtr conn,
+     if (qemuSetupCgroup(driver, vm) < 0)
+         goto cleanup;
+ 
+-    DEBUG0("Preparing host devices");
+-    if (qemuPrepareHostDevices(driver, vm->def) < 0)
+-        goto cleanup;
+-
+     if (VIR_ALLOC(priv->monConfig) < 0) {
+         virReportOOMError();
+         goto cleanup;
+-- 
+1.6.6.1
+
+From 65e97240e6e4606820dd1c42ac172319e0af4d8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 10:45:36 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] security: selinux: Fix crash when releasing non-existent label
+
+This can be triggered by the qemuStartVMDaemon cleanup path if a
+VM references a non-existent USB device (by product) in the XML.
+
+Signed-off-by: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/security/security_selinux.c |    3 ++-
+ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+index 975b315..6680e2d 100644
+--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
++++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+@@ -632,7 +632,8 @@ SELinuxReleaseSecurityLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
+ {
+     const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef = &vm->def->seclabel;
+ 
+-    if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC)
++    if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC ||
++        secdef->label == NULL)
+         return 0;
+ 
+     context_t con = context_new(secdef->label);
+-- 
+1.6.6.1
+

libvirt-0.7.7-no-secdriver-crash.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+commit b7a7b3365145f6e9e434a3265a58666cd2e6d8dd
+Author: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 17 21:04:11 2010 +0100
+
+    Don't crash without a security driver
+    
+    "virsh dominfo <vm>" crashes if there's no primary security driver set
+    since we only intialize the secmodel.model and secmodel.doi if we have
+    one. Attached patch checks for securityPrimaryDriver instead of
+    securityDriver since the later is always set in qemudSecurityInit().
+    
+    Closes: http://bugs.debian.org/574359
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index 1f2b11d..257f914 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -4979,7 +4979,7 @@ static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn,
+     int ret = 0;
+ 
+     qemuDriverLock(driver);
+-    if (!driver->securityDriver) {
++    if (!driver->securityPrimaryDriver) {
+         memset(secmodel, 0, sizeof (*secmodel));
+         goto cleanup;
+     }

libvirt-0.7.7-nodedev-conversions.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+commit 74c7a3463d18a530d6d749d0199061b5d3f17faa
+Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date:   Tue May 11 14:44:34 2010 -0400
+
+    node_device: udev: Fix PCI product/vendor swappage
+    
+    Product and vendor values were swapped in the XML, which made virt-manager
+    PCI device listing kinda useless.
+
+diff --git a/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c b/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
+index bcfe991..4a9d65f 100644
+--- a/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
++++ b/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
+@@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ static int udevTranslatePCIIds(unsigned int vendor,
+ 
+     /* pci_get_strings returns void */
+     pci_get_strings(&m,
+-                    &vendor_name,
+                     &device_name,
++                    &vendor_name,
+                     NULL,
+                     NULL);
+ 
+commit 75d88455f54088f88bc7a503da0a4cd413ef7b95
+Author: Klaus Ethgen <Klaus@Ethgen.de>
+Date:   Tue Apr 27 09:20:47 2010 +0200
+
+    The base used for conversion of USB values should be 16 not 10.
+    
+    Signed-off-by: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
+
+diff --git a/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c b/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
+index b12a49e..3a5a7e2 100644
+--- a/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
++++ b/src/node_device/node_device_udev.c
+@@ -548,8 +548,6 @@ out:
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-/* XXX Is 10 the correct base for the Number/Class/SubClass/Protocol
+- * conversions?  */
+ static int udevProcessUSBInterface(struct udev_device *device,
+                                    virNodeDeviceDefPtr def)
+ {
+@@ -559,28 +557,28 @@ static int udevProcessUSBInterface(struct udev_device *device,
+     if (udevGetUintSysfsAttr(device,
+                              "bInterfaceNumber",
+                              &data->usb_if.number,
+-                             10) == PROPERTY_ERROR) {
++                             16) == PROPERTY_ERROR) {
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+     if (udevGetUintSysfsAttr(device,
+                              "bInterfaceClass",
+                              &data->usb_if._class,
+-                             10) == PROPERTY_ERROR) {
++                             16) == PROPERTY_ERROR) {
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+     if (udevGetUintSysfsAttr(device,
+                              "bInterfaceSubClass",
+                              &data->usb_if.subclass,
+-                             10) == PROPERTY_ERROR) {
++                             16) == PROPERTY_ERROR) {
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+     if (udevGetUintSysfsAttr(device,
+                              "bInterfaceProtocol",
+                              &data->usb_if.protocol,
+-                             10) == PROPERTY_ERROR) {
++                             16) == PROPERTY_ERROR) {
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 

libvirt-0.7.7-pci-decimal-parsing.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+commit e984019688509605966c03cd77f4591d2cc222d3
+Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date:   Fri Apr 30 18:14:35 2010 +0200
+
+    domain: Fix PCI address decimal parsing regression
+    
+    <hostdev> address parsing previously attempted to detect the number
+    base: currently it is hardcoded to base 16, which can break PCI
+    assignment via virt-manager. Revert to the previous behavior.
+    
+    * src/conf/domain_conf.c: virDomainDevicePCIAddressParseXML, switch to
+      virStrToLong_ui(bus, NULL, 0, ...) to autodetect base
+
+diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+index 1607e8b..546ddf2 100644
+--- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c
++++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c
+@@ -1079,28 +1079,28 @@ virDomainDevicePCIAddressParseXML(xmlNodePtr node,
+     function = virXMLPropString(node, "function");
+ 
+     if (domain &&
+-        virStrToLong_ui(domain, NULL, 16, &addr->domain) < 0) {
++        virStrToLong_ui(domain, NULL, 0, &addr->domain) < 0) {
+         virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+                              _("Cannot parse <address> 'domain' attribute"));
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+     if (bus &&
+-        virStrToLong_ui(bus, NULL, 16, &addr->bus) < 0) {
++        virStrToLong_ui(bus, NULL, 0, &addr->bus) < 0) {
+         virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+                              _("Cannot parse <address> 'bus' attribute"));
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+     if (slot &&
+-        virStrToLong_ui(slot, NULL, 16, &addr->slot) < 0) {
++        virStrToLong_ui(slot, NULL, 0, &addr->slot) < 0) {
+         virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+                              _("Cannot parse <address> 'slot' attribute"));
+         goto cleanup;
+     }
+ 
+     if (function &&
+-        virStrToLong_ui(function, NULL, 16, &addr->function) < 0) {
++        virStrToLong_ui(function, NULL, 0, &addr->function) < 0) {
+         virDomainReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+                              _("Cannot parse <address> 'function' attribute"));
+         goto cleanup;

libvirt-0.7.7-qemu-startup-output.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+commit 83be64034a0b530c904ceb4fd1ed1c10b5cdf4bf
+Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon May 17 10:15:53 2010 -0400
+
+    qemu: Report cmdline output if VM dies early
+    
+    qemuReadLogOutput early VM death detection is racy and won't always work.
+    Startup then errors when connecting to the VM monitor. This won't report
+    the emulator cmdline output which is typically the most useful diagnostic.
+    
+    Check if the VM has died at the very end of the monitor connection step,
+    and if so, report the cmdline output.
+    
+    See also: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=581381
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+index ab6bec8..582fdee 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -2034,39 +2034,47 @@ static void qemudFreePtyPath(void *payload, const char *name ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+     VIR_FREE(payload);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++qemuReadLogFD(int logfd, char *buf, int maxlen, int off)
++{
++    int ret;
++    char *tmpbuf = buf + off;
++
++    ret = saferead(logfd, tmpbuf, maxlen - off - 1);
++    if (ret < 0) {
++        ret = 0;
++    }
++
++    tmpbuf[ret] = '\0';
++}
++
+ static int
+ qemudWaitForMonitor(struct qemud_driver* driver,
+                     virDomainObjPtr vm, off_t pos)
+ {
+-    char buf[4096]; /* Plenty of space to get startup greeting */
++    char buf[4096] = ""; /* Plenty of space to get startup greeting */
+     int logfd;
+     int ret = -1;
++    virHashTablePtr paths = NULL;
+ 
+-    if ((logfd = qemudLogReadFD(driver->logDir, vm->def->name, pos))
+-        < 0)
++    if ((logfd = qemudLogReadFD(driver->logDir, vm->def->name, pos)) < 0)
+         return -1;
+ 
+-    ret = qemudReadLogOutput(vm, logfd, buf, sizeof(buf),
+-                             qemudFindCharDevicePTYs,
+-                             "console", 30);
+-    if (close(logfd) < 0) {
+-        char ebuf[4096];
+-        VIR_WARN(_("Unable to close logfile: %s"),
+-                 virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
+-    }
+-
+-    if (ret < 0)
+-        return -1;
++    if (qemudReadLogOutput(vm, logfd, buf, sizeof(buf),
++                           qemudFindCharDevicePTYs,
++                           "console", 30) < 0)
++        goto closelog;
+ 
+     VIR_DEBUG("Connect monitor to %p '%s'", vm, vm->def->name);
+-    if (qemuConnectMonitor(driver, vm) < 0)
+-        return -1;
++    if (qemuConnectMonitor(driver, vm) < 0) {
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
+ 
+     /* Try to get the pty path mappings again via the monitor. This is much more
+      * reliable if it's available.
+      * Note that the monitor itself can be on a pty, so we still need to try the
+      * log output method. */
+-    virHashTablePtr paths = virHashCreate(0);
++    paths = virHashCreate(0);
+     if (paths == NULL) {
+         virReportOOMError();
+         goto cleanup;
+@@ -2087,6 +2095,23 @@ cleanup:
+         virHashFree(paths, qemudFreePtyPath);
+     }
+ 
++    if (kill(vm->pid, 0) == -1 && errno == ESRCH) {
++        /* VM is dead, any other error raised in the interim is probably
++         * not as important as the qemu cmdline output */
++        qemuReadLogFD(logfd, buf, sizeof(buf), strlen(buf));
++        qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
++                        _("process exited while connecting to monitor: %s"),
++                        buf);
++        ret = -1;
++    }
++
++closelog:
++    if (close(logfd) < 0) {
++        char ebuf[4096];
++        VIR_WARN(_("Unable to close logfile: %s"),
++                 virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf));
++    }
++
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 

libvirt-0.7.7-set-kernel-perms.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From 3f1aa08af6580c215d973bc6bf57f505dbf8b926 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2010 13:38:39 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] security: Set permissions for kernel/initrd
+
+Fixes URL installs when running virt-install as root on Fedora.
+---
+ src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c    |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/security/security_selinux.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+index 6911f48..1883fbe 100644
+--- a/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
++++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security_dac.c
+@@ -332,6 +332,15 @@ qemuSecurityDACRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
+                                                      vm->def->disks[i]) < 0)
+             rc = -1;
+     }
++
++    if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
++        qemuSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.kernel) < 0)
++        rc = -1;
++
++    if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
++        qemuSecurityDACRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.initrd) < 0)
++        rc = -1;
++
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -356,6 +365,18 @@ qemuSecurityDACSetSecurityAllLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
+             return -1;
+     }
+ 
++    if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
++        qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(vm->def->os.kernel,
++                                    driver->user,
++                                    driver->group) < 0)
++        return -1;
++
++    if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
++        qemuSecurityDACSetOwnership(vm->def->os.initrd,
++                                    driver->user,
++                                    driver->group) < 0)
++        return -1;
++
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+index b2c8581..975b315 100644
+--- a/src/security/security_selinux.c
++++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c
+@@ -616,6 +616,14 @@ SELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
+             rc = -1;
+     }
+ 
++    if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
++        SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.kernel) < 0)
++        rc = -1;
++
++    if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
++        SELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(vm->def->os.initrd) < 0)
++        rc = -1;
++
+     return rc;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -736,6 +744,14 @@ SELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel(virDomainObjPtr vm)
+             return -1;
+     }
+ 
++    if (vm->def->os.kernel &&
++        SELinuxSetFilecon(vm->def->os.kernel, default_content_context) < 0)
++        return -1;
++
++    if (vm->def->os.initrd &&
++        SELinuxSetFilecon(vm->def->os.initrd, default_content_context) < 0)
++        return -1;
++
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+1.6.6.1
+

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-344a6913a94582ea3ab0ad75a9bfef22  libvirt-0.6.4.tar.gz
+5f315b0bf20e3964f7657ba1e630cd67  libvirt-0.7.7.tar.gz